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This chapter examines the impact that Japan’s Twenty-One Demands towards
China in 1915 had on Anglo–Japanese relations, mainly focussing on the
conflict that emerged in diplomatic negotiations and newspaper reports. The
Twenty-One Demands were presented by the O
-
kuma Shigenobu government
to the Yuan Shikai administration in order to enlarge Japanese interests in
China. They consisted of five groups, and the main contents were as follows.
Group I confirmation of Japan’s seizure of German ports in Shandong Province
Group II expansion of Japan’s interests in southern Manchuria and eastern
Mongolia
Group III Japanese control of the Hanyeping mining and metallurgical
complex in central China
Group IV the prohibiting of China from giving any further coastal or
island concessions to foreign powers except for Japan
Group V the compelling of China to hire Japanese advisors on finance and
policing, empowering Japan to build three major railways, establishing a joint
police organization of China and Japan and so forth
Groups I–IV were proposed with the intention of expanding Japan’s exist-
ing interests. It was natural that China was opposed to them. However, they
were not unacceptable to the Allied Powers, considering that Japan had
declared war against Germany on the basis of the Anglo–Japanese alliance in
August 1914. On the other hand, most of the articles of Group V were not
based on existing interests and were likely to conflict with the equality of
commercial opportunity among all nations in China and the preservation of
its territorial integrity. Therefore, not only China but also Britain, Japan’s
main ally, and the United States, which had in 1899 required all foreign
powers to agree to the above-mentioned principles, were strongly opposed to
the demands. Japan succeeded in having China accept Groups I–IV in return
for deleting Group V from the demands, but the relations between Japan and
other countries became unprecedentedly worse. Therefore the issue of the
Twenty-One Demands was a major turning point in Japanese diplomatic
history.1
There have been a lot of previous studies on this topic, many of which have
focussed on US-Japan relations. The Wilson administration was much con-
cerned about this crisis, and the then Secretary of State, William J. Bryan,
issued a statement that refused to recognize the treaties concluded on the
basis of Japan’s demands. This so-called ‘(First) Bryan Statement’ is regarded
as the beginning of the American ‘non-recognition’ policy, which was revived
in the 1930s. In America, some books on the ‘Demands’were published straight
after the First World War2, and scholars such as Arthur Link and Noel H.
Pugach produced further studies after the Second World War.3 Since then,
Horikawa Takeo, Hosoya Chihiro, Kitaoka Shin-ichi, Shimada Yoichi, Takahara
Shusuke and Kawashima Shin in Japan and Frederick Dickinson and Noriko
Kawamura in the US have expanded the historiography.4
In contrast, there have been relatively few studies focussed on Anglo–Japanese
relations. One of the exceptions is Peter Lowe’s Great Britain and Japan,
which was published in 1969.5 He produced as comprehensive a survey of
public and private documents in Britain as possible, and analyzed the issue of
the Twenty-One Demands in the context of the history of Anglo–Japanese
relations. His study, based on clear evidence, succeeded in presenting a per-
suasive interpretation, and faults cannot be found with his conclusions.
However, there is room for expansion of his study through the examination of
Japanese primary resources which Lowe did not survey and to build on other
recent studies. This paper attempts to re-examine how the diplomatic nego-
tiations concerning the Twenty-One Demands proceeded and what impact
they had on Anglo–Japanese relations.
In this paper, I will focus on the British newspapers and journalists which
have been neglected in previous studies. British newspapers were in a serious
dilemma in the face of Japan’s demands. Japanese expansion in China clearly
had the potential to damage existing British interests, but Japan was a British
ally and Japanese support was necessary for maintaining the war against Germany.
The Manchester Guardian, whose position was near to that of the radicals
and which reflected the interests of the commercial community of Lancashire,
was critical of Japan’s demands and insisted that British interests in China
should be protected. On the other hand, The Times, which was conservative and
friendly with the Foreign Office, basically reported in favour of Japan.
The director of the Foreign Department of The Times in those days was
Henry Wickham Steed. He took the lead in reporting on East Asia, gathering
information from correspondents in the field and consulting other principal
members of the company, including Sir Valentine Chirol, a former head of the
Foreign Department. The correspondent responsible for East Asia was David
Fraser.6 Although based in Beijing, he was practically a Tokyo correspondent
as well, as he often moved between China and Japan collecting news mate-
rial.7 Another correspondent, William Donald, worked in Beijing under Fraser’s
guidance.8 This Australian journalist was clearly pro-Chinese and commu-
nicated closely with other pro-Chinese sympathizers such as George Morrison,9
another Australian journalist who was a former Beijing correspondent of The
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Times and was now employed as a political advisor to President Yuan Shikai
since 1912, and Paul Reinsch,10 the American minister in China.11 This paper
examines their influence on the way in which The Times reported on the
Twenty-One Demands, using documents from the News International Archives
and the George Morrison Papers in the State Library of New South Wales.
The submission of the Twenty-One Demands
The Japanese government declared war on Germany on 23 August 1914 and
took control of German possessions in Asia and the Pacific within three
months. The German colonies in the Western Pacific north of the equator
were occupied in October, and Qingdao – the German concession in China –
fell in November. The biggest objective that the Japanese government wished
to achieve on this occasion was to extend the privileges that it had acquired in
Manchuria after the Russo-Japanese War. In the peace treaty it had gained
the right to lease Port Arthur and Dalian and to manage the South Man-
churian Railways, but these rights were granted on a fixed-term basis and
some of them were scheduled to expire in 1923. Faced with this troubling
situation, Kato- Takaaki, the Japanese foreign minister, thought that the Chi-
nese might agree to extend the terms of the Japanese rights in Manchuria if
Japan would return Shandong to China’s sovereignty.
However, the domestic political situation made it difficult for the Japanese
government to act upon Kato- ’s blueprint. After the initial military success in
Asia and the Pacific, many individuals within Japan started to advocate that
their government should take this occasion to expand its interests in China.
These individuals argued against the idea of handing Qingdao back. The
Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) also advocated that the government should
take assertive measures to expand Japanese interests in China. Although Kato-
was critical of these opinions, he and the Japanese Foreign Office (Gaimusho-)
could not ignore them. It was due to strong pressure from the IJA that he
ended up inserting the seven articles which belonged to the fifth group of
demands – which were by far the harshest requests that the Japanese made
towards the Chinese government. The Twenty-One Demands were drawn up
by 3 December and the document was submitted to Yuan on 18 January 1915.
Kato- was fully aware that the demands in Group V might induce a sharp
reaction not only from the Chinese but also from the Western powers.
Therefore he emphasized to the Chinese that the real demands lay in the first
four groups (Group I–IV), and that the fifth group (Group V) were only
‘requests’. In addition, when Kato- disclosed the contents of the Japanese
conditions to the British, Russian, French and American governments, he
showed them only the first four groups of demands, and deliberately con-
cealed the articles which belonged to Group V. He was hoping that he could
conclude the negotiations with the Chinese government as secretly and swiftly
as possible, before the Western governments could learn about the contents of
the Japanese demands.
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Such negotiation tactics might have worked during the time of the Qing
dynasty. However, the Japanese demands were extremely difficult for the new
Chinese government to accept. China was, after all, going through a rapid
growth of nationalism after the Xinhai Revolution of 1911–12. Yuan imme-
diately leaked the contents of the demands, including the fifth group which
had not been revealed to the Western governments, to journalists in China.
By late January 1915 the fact that the Japanese had submitted twenty-one
demands had become fully revealed, and resulted in unleashing widespread
criticism towards Japan in the Chinese press. The phrase ‘Japan’s Twenty-One
Demands’ started to gain a negative connotation during this period. In addi-
tion, the Japanese demands began to catch the attention of American news-
papers around the same time. Before the Japanese government could make
counterarguments against such reports, numerous newspaper stories –
including inaccurate ones – circulated around the press, and they contributed
to creating a ‘rumour’ that Japan was intending to take drastic measures to
expand its interests in China.
The Chinese leak of Group V and the rise of anti-Japanese opinion
Yuan attempted to arouse the suspicion of the Western governments against
Japan by leaking the contents of Japanese demands, in the hope that these
countries would intervene on his behalf. Therefore Yuan’s government con-
tinued to leak the information even after late January. The accurate details of
the demands were communicated to Morrison by Yuan and his confidant, Cai
Tinggan, sometime between 4 and 5 February. The information was then
passed on to Sir John Jordan, the British minister to China. Around the same
time, Donald gained the same information from Zhou Ziqi, the finance min-
ister of the Chinese government, and Paul Reinsch, the American minister to
China. On 7 February Donald telegraphed this information to Fraser, who at
this time was in Tokyo, and the latter showed this document to Kato- in an
interview that they had the following day. The Japanese foreign minister had
no alternative but to admit to the existence of Group V of the demands. In his
memorandum, Fraser wrote as follows:
I ventured my surprise that his office had formulated such proposals, for
he, with his knowledge of international politics, must have known quite
well that all the foreign offices of the Powers concerned would be horri-
fied to realize what Japan was aiming at. He interrupted me at once. ‘The
demands were not formulated in my office; They were passed over to me
by the military with instructions to have them presented to Yuan Shi-Kai
without delay.’12
Fraser also informed Sir Conyngham Greene, the British ambassador to
Japan, about Group V. Greene then visited the Gaimusho- on 9 February to
strongly protest.
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Donald forwarded a detailed report about Group V to London, which
reached The Times headquarters by 10 February. As the Foreign Office and
the Japanese embassy in Britain both denied the existence of the group, Steed
decided to censor this section of Donald’s report before publication.13 In
addition, The Times argued on 13 February through its editorial that the
Japanese demands did not violate the territorial integrity of China and the
principle of open door.14
Eki Hioki, the Japanese minister to China, used these articles to inform the
Chinese government that the British supported the Japanese demands.15
There also were many Japanese newspapers, such as To-kyo- Nichi Nichi
Shimbun, which referred to The Times’ criticism of China’s attitude over this
issue.16 In contrast, the newspaper articles of The Times sparked a strong
reaction in China. The Peking Gazette, an English newspaper that was sym-
pathetic to the Yuan administration, published an editorial on 16 February
which argued that The Times, steered by Japan, was leading the world in the
wrong direction. Morrison, Donald and Jordan all supported this conten-
tion.17 Even in Britain, there were newspapers such as the Manchester Guar-
dian which were critical towards Japan. This newspaper was read principally
by individuals in the commercial and industrial sector of Lancashire, who
paid great interest to trade in China. On 17 February it posted an editorial
titled ‘Japan and China’ and, after reporting that there were currently many
unofficial rumours circulating about the Japanese demands, raised its concern
about the fact that ‘Japan’s action is in some ways scarcely compatible with
the declared object of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance’.18
Despite the fact that The Times forwarded articles which were somewhat
supportive of the Japanese stance over this issue, most of the other news-
papers were becoming increasingly critical towards Japan. In this environment,
Yuan handed the full translation of the twenty-one demands to Morrison on
15 February.19 Morrison immediately forwarded this to Jordan, who passed it
on to the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, the next day.20
The failure of Kato- ’s attempt for swift conclusion of the negotiations
As Kato- wanted to ensure confidentiality over this issue, he did not relay
information about the existence of Group V even to his ambassadors,
including Inoue Katsunosuke, the ambassador to London. However, infor-
mation about this issue was becoming an open secret by mid-February, and
on 17 February the Japanese foreign minister decided to inform Inoue about
Group V through a telegraph. In the subsequent communication, he added
that he had chosen not to disclose the existence of the fifth group because it
was fundamentally different in its substance from the first four groups.21
Inoue belatedly understood the situation, and forwarded three important
telegrams to Tokyo two days later.22
The first telegraph informed Kato- that there had been a rapid growth of
anti-Japanese sentiment in Britain. Inoue pointed out that while The Times
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and the Daily Telegraph had not yet objected to the recent Japanese diplo-
matic manoeuvres in China, the Manchester Guardian was becoming
increasingly critical towards Japan, and the ambassador duly forwarded a
copy of the editorial on 17 February. Inoue added that the Japanese actions in
China ‘could induce a strong reaction from the British public. … If the
[Japanese] imperial government fails to deal with this issue in a satisfactory
manner, then it could be put into a very difficult situation in terms of
diplomacy.’
The second telegraph pointed out that, if the fifth group of the demands
were presented simultaneously with the other demands and became a focal
part of the negotiations, then it would be difficult to convince the Western
governments that there was a fine distinction between the fifth and the other
groups of demands. Inoue also suggested that it was highly likely that the
Chinese government had already leaked the full contents of the Japanese demands,
and feared that the British government might accuse Japan of duplicity.
The third and the last telegraph reported on the interview that Inoue had
with Steed, who visited him on the day this telegraph was sent to Japan. Steed
had a close relationship with many Japanese diplomats in London, and held a
relatively favourable opinion of Japan.23 This sentiment had led him to con-
ceal some of the contents of Donald’s report about the Japanese demands,
and post an editorial that showed sympathy towards the Japanese position.
Yet, even Steed felt compelled to inform Inoue that he was deeply concerned
about the recent actions that the Japanese government had taken in China, as
Steed had already been informed by Jordan that Donald’s report was accu-
rate. He also told Inoue that British residents in Beijing were infuriated by the
fact that the Japanese were utilising the opinion of The Times to support their
case. After this interview, Inoue realized that the British government knew about
the details of the Japanese demands, and requested Kato- for instructions.
The Japanese foreign minister duly permitted his ambassador in Britain to
provide information about Group V,24 and Inoue did so in a meeting with
Beilby Alston of the Foreign Office on 20 February and with Steed on the
following day.25 Upon learning this, Grey decided on 22 February that he
should revise British policy towards East Asia which had been based upon
the belief that Group V did not exist, and communicated to the Japanese
government through Greene that his government wished that British interests
and the spirit of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance be respected.26
Kato- complied with this request, but he also argued that ‘there was no
particular intent to hide’ Group V as he hitherto had done, and also requested
the British government not to intervene in the Sino–Japanese negotiations.27
He also reiterated to the Russian, American and French ambassadors that the
fifth group ‘was not a demand’, and also that it ‘was not intended to violate
the territorial integrity of China’.28 Yet, the Sino–Japanese negotiations had
seen virtually no progress even after a month after the Japanese government
had submitted its demands. Meanwhile, the Chinese criticism and the suspi-
cion of the West towards Japan had become stronger. Kato- ’s initial tactics to
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conclude the Sino–Japanese negotiations as quickly as possible and present
them as fait accompli to the Western governments had failed.
Continuing difficulties
Hioki, who was facing strong resistance from the Chinese, considered it
impossible to settle this issue unless the Japanese government softened its
attitude. On 12 February he advised Kato- that the latter should prioritise the
negotiations over the first four groups of demands, and leave the fifth group
until the talks concluded.29 However, Kato- rejected Hioki’s suggestion the
next day and replied that there were ‘precedents’ for the Chinese government
accepting demands similar to those in Group V when the Japanese govern-
ment had requested them in the past. He therefore instructed his minister in
Beijing not to back down over these demands until the Chinese considered
them in a positive spirit.30
While Hioki did not raise any objections to these instructions, there is evi-
dence that suggests he was disappointed. When he met Fraser after the latter’s
return to China in March, he said that he thought ‘the [Japanese] government
had made a serious mistake’.31 However, the domestic political situation was
making it increasingly difficult for the government in Tokyo to make com-
promises in the negotiations. As the contents of the demands had now been
thoroughly leaked, Japanese newspapers sharply criticized the Chinese atti-
tude, and demanded that the government be firm. Being the leader of the
ruling party, Kato- could not make compromises that might induce a public
outcry, especially as a general election was scheduled to take place on 25
March. On 16 February the O
-
kuma administration had approved a new draft
of demands with only minor amendments, and authorized Hioki to promise
that the Japanese government would give back Jiaozhou Bay around Qing-
dao, the German concession in China that was currently under the Japanese
occupation, if the Chinese government would accept the Japanese demands.32
The administration recognized that this was ‘practically the only bargaining
card that it had’, and instructed its minister in Beijing that he should utilize it
at his discretion.
There were no particular changes to the stance of the Japanese government
towards Group V. Kato- ’s uncompromising attitude over this issue might also
have been affected by the fact that the reaction of the Western governments
towards these demands seemed much weaker than he had expected. When he
communicated the contents of the fifth group to Greene, he believed that
Britain would react adversely against the fifth article within Group V, which
demanded concessions on railroads in south of China, and the sixth article
which demanded that the Chinese government not concede Fujian province
to any other power. However, Greene did not raise any particular objections
towards these two articles, and he even said that he thought there was ‘no
reason to think that the British government would consider anything parti-
cularly problematic’ about the Japanese demands over Fujian.33 The Russian
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and French ambassadors in Japan showed interest in the fourth article within
Group V, which mentioned Japanese arms sales to China, and the American
ambassador showed concern about the third article which demanded joint
Sino–Japanese police institutions in China, but they too did not raise strong
objections. Perhaps this reaction made Kato- somewhat optimistic that he could
push through at least some of the demands in Group V. In face of the public
outcry that the Twenty-One Demands had caused, it would not be surprising
if Kato- was looking for measures to appease public opinion and recoup the
political influence of his party and administration by pushing the articles
which initially were intended to be only ‘desired conditions’. As a result, Kato- ’s
stance over the issue of the demands became inconsistent and inflexible; he
would persist in pushing for some of the articles in Group V until May, when
he submitted an ultimatum to China.
Yet, it was impossible for the negotiations to proceed as long as the Japa-
nese government remained firm over the demands in Group V and the Chi-
nese continued to be adamant that they would not discuss them. Under these
circumstances, the next initiative that Kato- took up was to resort to military
intimidation. On 10 March he suggested in a Cabinet meeting that the Japa-
nese government should postpone its planned withdrawal of troops from
Manchuria and the Shandong peninsula, and send in another division.
Yamagata Aritomo, one of the genro- who cast strong influence over the army,
criticized this decision.34 However, Kato- feared that under the current situa-
tion, even the negotiations over the interests in Manchuria might fail if he did
not take any additional measures. The foreign minister’s suggestion was
approved by the Cabinet, and thus the Japanese military presence in China
was reinforced by mid-March.
This only resulted in hardening Chinese attitudes even further, and also
made Western governments more suspicious about Japanese intentions. When
Jordan met with Yuan on 13 March, the latter told him that the negotiations
were proceeding smoothly, but he could not be responsible for what might
come of any resort to force.35 On the other hand, the criticism within Japa-
nese political circles and media against the Chinese attitude towards the
Japanese demands also became stronger after the military reinforcement. The
ruling party, the Do-shikai, managed to win a landslide victory in the general
election which was held under conditions of strong excitement, as if the
country were in the midst of a war. However, the negotiations still showed no
sign of progress even in April, and hit deadlock.
Rising British mistrust of the Japanese
The negotiations reached an impasse, but ultimately a compromise was
reached. Viewed from the outside, it seems that Britain might have helped
bring about that compromise, but from the perspective of those involved
directly the compromise was a result of pressure from Japan’s elder statesmen.
First let us consider the way in which Britain handled the situation.
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As the details of the demands Japan had issued to China came to light in
Britain, members of the Foreign Office and the press quickly became more
critical of Japan. Unfavourable articles about the Japanese demands began to
appear in newspapers in mid-February, leading to a barrage of questions
about the Twenty-One Demands in Parliament.36 The members asking ques-
tions were all ‘backbenchers’, and they elicited no more than curt replies from
Foreign Secretary Grey and Neil Primrose, the under-secretary of state for
foreign affairs. Thus Ambassador Inoue initially reported that the issue would
have negligible political impact.37 Of course, as Grey explained to Inoue, it
would put him in a very difficult position if a breakdown in Sino–Japanese
relations led to a situation developing that was opposed to the objectives of
the Anglo–Japanese alliance; a rise in anti-Japanese sentiment inside Britain
was certainly not something he could afford to ignore.38
In fact, from March to April the Foreign Office was inundated with letters
from companies and groups with deep connections to China insisting on a
halt to the Japanese advance into China and the protection of British profits.
Chief among the groups that applied such pressure were: the British-American
Tobacco Company (2 March); the China Association (24 March, 1 April); the
Manchester Chamber of Commerce (27 March); the London Chamber of
Commerce (12 April); and the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce (15 April).39
On 6 April the Chinese representatives on the Legislative Council adopted an
emergency measure asking the British government to support China on the
grounds that Japan’s demands violated the principles of equal trading
opportunity and Chinese territorial integrity.40
On 8 March Grey met with Counsellor Honda Kumataro- to inform the
latter of his own views of the Twenty-One Demands.41 As he had done in the
past, Grey expressed his understanding – up to a point – of Japan’s expansion
of its position in Manchuria. He went on to state that the only Japanese
demands with a direct impact on British interests were related to railways,
suggesting that, with the exception of Article V of Group V, none of the other
demands were particularly problematic. He was most concerned about the
possibility that a collapse in the negotiations would cause instability in China
that could harm British interests. Grey expressed those reservations clearly,
putting Japan on warning:
The concessions related to the British railways are, as it were, minor
points. What causes me anxiety is the possibility of political develop-
ments arising out of the Japanese negotiations with China. … I think that
China should make concessions. At the same time, I do hope that Japan
will attempt to persuade China patiently in order not to cause a breakdown
in the negotiations.42
Although Grey adopted a reserved tone during this meeting, claiming that the
fifth article of Group V was a ‘minor point’, he actually took the matter quite
seriously. On 10March he had Greene deliver a memorandum to Kato- insisting
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that Japan should respect Britain’s railroad interests in southern China, revealing
Britain’s absolute opposition to Group V, Article V.43 Kato- did not respond to the
document, but he must have felt the need to take British views into consideration.
On 15 March Secretary of State Bryan delivered the first ‘Bryan State-
ment’, a memorandum dated 13 March, to the Japanese ambassador Chinda
Sutemi. Based on Bryan’s goal of peacefully resolving the conflict, the mem-
orandum, produced with revisions from within the State Department,
expressed objections to four of the articles in Group V.44 Compared to the
British response, it raised objections to more of the items, but it did not object
to the demands Japan was making in regards to Manchuria or Shandong; in
contrast to previous American efforts to keep Japan’s interests in Manchuria
in check, the note had a placatory tone that implied the Americans had
retreated.45 Accordingly, Kato- did not find the document especially threaten-
ing. When Greene met with Kato- on 17 March, he observed that Kato- did
not seem to be taking the note very seriously.46
After the existence of Group V came to light, however, British journalists
grew increasingly mistrustful of the Japanese. When Steed met Counsellor
Honda on 24 February, he promised not to publish editorials on the Sino–
Japanese talks in his paper for the time being, in the interest of promoting
mutual Anglo–Japanese understanding.47 Yet in a letter to Fraser he revealed
that his confidence in Japan was already crumbling, although he felt that the
whole question of their relations with Japan would depend on the war and
there was very little use in quarrelling with the Japanese now.48
Perhaps that explains why The Times published an article entitled ‘Japanese
Pressure on China: Fear of a Crisis’ on 12 March, with additional reporting
on the story appearing on 16 and 19 March.49 Between 1 and 16 April the
paper frequently featured stories on the Sino–Japanese negotiations: ‘Japanese
Demands On China: Six Points Settled’ (1); ‘The Japanese Claims On China:
Extra-Territorial Rights’ (2); ‘Supply Of Arms To China: Japanese Demands
Resisted’ (3); ‘Japanese Interests In China: Important Statement by Count
O
-
kuma’ (5); ‘Japanese Trade Policy: Conflicts with British Interests, The
Demands on China’ (6); ‘The Japanese Claims On China: Embargo on the
coast’ (13); and ‘Japanese Demands Of China: The Railway Concessions’
(16).50 Unlike other newspapers, the editorial section of The Times was not
critical of Japan, but it was clear that the paper’s overall tone had changed;
Kato- began to perceive that The Times was featuring more ‘sensational’ stor-
ies that were inconvenient for Japan.
Kato- responded by sending a telegram to Inoue on 17 April, instructing the
latter to explain to Steed the issue surrounding the railways in southern China
(the fifth article of Group V) that were of concern to the British and to
request that he stop publishing articles that were unfavourable towards
Japan.51 Based on those directives, a meeting between Honda and Walter
Scott, the deputy chief of the foreign news desk, was scheduled for 30 April.
From that meeting until the final stage of the negotiations, The Times would
continue to refrain from publishing strong criticisms of Japan.
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Fraser, the correspondent then in Tokyo, did not agree with Steed on this
point. Meeting with Kato- for a second time on 22 February, Fraser ques-
tioned him further on the details of Group V. According to Japanese
accounts, Fraser agreed with Kato- ’s explanation, replying that all of the
Japanese demands seemed reasonable and the problems of the British rail-
ways would be easily solved between Britain and Japan in the future.52 Unlike
his predecessor Morrison, Fraser was not necessarily biased towards China,
which led Kato- to hope that he would write articles that showed an under-
standing of the Japanese point of view. He told Hioki to win Fraser over and
‘manipulate’ him when he returned to Beijing in April.53
As he watched the negotiations unfold, however, and as criticisms mounted
against the Japanese, Fraser adopted a more critical stance towards Japan. He
was particularly concerned about the issue of the railways in southern China.
When he met with Hioki on 19 April, Fraser criticized Japan, insisting that
the Japanese demands regarding the railways in southern China were a chal-
lenge to British interests, and that the ways of the Japanese government could
hardly be justified.54 After returning to Peking, Fraser wrote articles based on
his reporting in Japan, but Hioki observed that he had been forced to change his
outlook because those articles were attacked and mocked by British living in
China. It appeared to Hioki that Fraser regretted meeting with Kato- as he
felt deceived by him. In fact, Fraser wrote in a letter to Steed dated 17 March
that he thought the British Foreign Office had not realized that Kato- was a
‘pretty slippery gentleman’ and Hioki a ‘certain little liar’.55
In contrast to The Times, the Manchester Guardian was strongly critical in
its stories on Japan. It continued actively reporting on the Sino–Japanese
negotiations well into March,56 and published an editorial on 13 March
entitled ‘The Japanese Demands’, which argued that, ‘What we have to do is
to interpret the Japanese Demands in the light of Anglo–Japanese Treaty.’57
In that context, the paper sent the Japanese government into a panic when,
on 18 March, it suddenly published a scoop entitled ‘A Complete List of
Japan’s Demands on China: Formidable Programme in Five Sections, Comparison
with the Version First Given by Japan’, which compared the full text of the
demands Japan had submitted to China with the unofficial list of demands
(which excluded Group V) that Japan had released to the Great Powers,
including Britain. Inoue sent a telegram to Kato- on 20 March, reporting
that, ‘Ever since the exposure in the Manchester Guardian, radical papers,
including that publication, have gradually become increasingly aggressive.’58
Since the Chinese government was exerting pressure on the British govern-
ment, Inoue was concerned that ‘this may lead to a troublesome situation for
Japan’.59
On 30 March Inoue met with Walter Langley, the assistant under-secretary
at the Foreign Office who supervised the Far Eastern Department, and asked
him to try to find out who had leaked the information to the Manchester
Guardian. Langley assured him the leak did not come from within the British
government. The true source of the leak was never revealed, but, as the article
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carried the byline ‘from our correspondent’, it seems likely that its special cor-
respondent in China, Bertram Lenox Simpson, had obtained the information
from someone in Yuan Shikai’s administration.
Throughout the months of March and April, the paper continued its daily
coverage of the Sino–Japanese negotiations. The main articles were: ‘Japan
and China: The United States Note’ (19 March); ‘United States & Japan: The
Chinese Agreement of 1908’ (23 March); ‘China and Japan: An Army of
Defence Round Pekin’ (24 March); ‘China and Japan: Military Measures
Round Pekin’ (30 March); ‘Japan and China: Tokio’s Reply to American
Note’ (31 March); ‘Japan and China: A Favourable Turn’ (3 April); ‘Japan’s
Demands upon China: The Premier’s Statement’ (5 April); ‘Japan and China:
A Suave Comment in Pekin’ (7 April); ‘Japan and China: British Railway
Interests’ (14 April).60 In a meeting with Ambassador Greene, Kato- lamen-
ted, ‘This sort of information leak is terrible. Now it will be difficult to reach
a compromise.’61
The settlement caused by the final notification
In late April the Sino–Japanese talks appeared to have stalled, and within the
Japanese government those arguing in favour of taking a hardline stance
against China were gaining momentum. In an editorial on 22 April, the
To-kyo- Asahi shimbun called for a ‘firm resolution’, insisting that it was time to
prepare for the opening of hostilities.62 Other national papers like the To-kyo-
Nichi Nichi Shimbun and the Jiji shimpo- also adopted a tough stance,
although they did not go so far as to insist on a declaration of war.63 The
party publication of the ruling Do-shikai party, the Ho-chi shimbun, blamed the
Chinese for the breakdown in the negotiations, while the opposition Seiyu-kai
party paper, the Chu-o- shimbun, criticized the government for its ‘failure of
diplomacy’ and spoke out strongly against compromising with the Chinese.64
After meeting on 21 and 24 April, respectively, members of the Do-shikai and
the Seiyu-kai resolved that the O
-
kuma Cabinet should carry out its demands.65
Stirred on by the ultranationalists To-yama Mitsuru and Uchida Ryo-hei, the
KokuminGaiko- Do-meikai (People’s Diplomacy League; a political group formed
the previous year that supported an uncompromising foreign policy) spon-
sored a social gathering on 27April devoted to discussion of the ‘China problem’,
and it was attended by over two hundred activists.66
Yamagata Aritomo, Matsukata Masayoshi, Inoue Kaoru, and O
-
yama
Iwao, the four senior statesmen with the most political power, all lamented
the situation that had developed, but there was nothing they could do about
it. When Matsukata met with Hara Takashi, president of the Seiyu-kai, on 19
April, he claimed that he and Yamagata had read about the demands that
Japan had issued to China in the newspaper; neither of them had seen any of
the diplomatic documents. Several days earlier, Prime Minister O
-
kuma had
visited Matsukata to report that the issue in China would soon be resolved,
but now there was no sign of a resolution. Matsukata told Hara, ‘I am
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overcome with dread when I think about the future of our diplomacy.’67
Somehow, information on the state of affairs in the O
-
kuma Cabinet made its
way to the senior statesmen either via Home Minister O
-
ura Kanetake,
Yamagata’s trusted friend, or Mochizuki Kotaro-, a Do-shikai-affiliated
member of the Diet who acted as Inoue Kaoru’s private secretary.68 Never-
theless, there was hardly any mutual understanding between the government and
the senior statesmen. Thus, the senior statesmen remained in the dark as the
negotiations moved into their final stage.
At a Cabinet meeting on 20 April, Kato- proposed offering the ‘return of
Jiaozhou Bay’ to the Chinese, and his proposal was accepted. Of course it
would not be an unconditional return; four conditions would be attached,
including the right to develop a harbour in the former German leasehold in
Jiaozhou Bay and to build an exclusive Japanese concession, as well as con-
cessions to be shared with the other Great Powers. Kato- hoped that this
compromise would finally bring the negotiations to an end. The following
day, Kato- and War Minister Ichinosuke Oka visited Yamagata’s residence
together to read him the text of the revised proposal that had been adopted
by the Cabinet (they did not give him a copy of the document).69 Yamagata
believed that the Japanese demands were still too unreasonable, even in the
revised proposal, and he responded with the following candid remarks:
As I have already explained, I fundamentally disagree with you. As I
peruse the list of demands, I see many items that could be easily achieved
if Sino–Japanese relations improved, without any particular need to sti-
pulate them in a treaty. The great powers, in particular, are not likely to
greet any of these demands favorably. Looking back over the last forty-
odd years of imperial diplomacy, in the days when Ito- (Hirobumi) and
Inoue (Kaoru) were in charge, the utmost care was given to all matters
involving Europe and the United States. The cabinet was consulted even
on issues that individual bureau chiefs decide today based on their own
discretion, and those issues were discussed in cabinet meetings that lasted
into the night. Now, after the Sino–Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars
have established Japan as one of the world’s great powers, it may not be
necessary to show as much consideration to the Western powers as we did
in the past, but it would be too vain of us to consider Japan’s current
status to be equal to that of Great Britain.
As far as these demands on the Chinese are concerned, it would have
been appropriate to design them so that one or two of the items would
bring mutual benefits for the Western powers too, but the current list of
demands is too heavily skewed toward Japan’s own interests. When deal-
ing with the Westerners, it is not advisable to give them the impression
that Japan is bullying the weak. It may be necessary to make a final
resolution if our demands regarding Manchuria and Mongolia are rejec-
ted, but as I already told you, we should not go to war simply because the
items in Group V were not accepted.
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Kato- responded optimistically, arguing that ‘China will happily agree to most
of our demands’ because Japan was going to return Jiaozhou Bay. In the
event that China rejected the revised proposal, Yamagata asked, ‘Do you
intend to declare war immediately?’ Although Yamagata was slightly relieved
when Kato- replied, ‘No, we will continue our discussions’, he went on to
caution the latter on a number of additional points. Kato- sought the senior
statesmen’s approval so tenaciously that, on the following day, he was ulti-
mately able to obtain their consent to the Cabinet resolution after Yamagata
contacted Matsukata and Inoue.
Subsequently, Kato- kept in contact with Hioki as he re-evaluated the
revised proposal, which was approved by the Cabinet on 26 April. In that
revision of the document, the third article of Group V (merger of Chinese
and Japanese police forces) was retracted. As for the rest of the items in
Group V, however, although they were supposed to be excluded from the
treaty and concessions were supposed to be made along the lines of the Chi-
nese government’s demands and official exchange notes, the same demands,
strongly reflecting the spirit of the original Japanese text, were still being
made.70
When he submitted the revised proposal to the Chinese, Kato- simulta-
neously delivered an unofficial announcement to the British via Ambassador
Inoue. His goal in doing so was to gain British understanding of the conclu-
sion of the Sino–Japanese treaty in regards to the issue of the railways in
southern China (the fifth article of Group V), which had caused so much
agitation among the British. Inoue announced to Grey that the revised pro-
posal represented the greatest compromise Japan was willing to make,
arguing, ‘However the situation develops from this point, it is entirely up to
the Chinese.’ Grey responded by saying, ‘In the unfortunate eventuality that
these events should lead to a rupture, I implore you to ensure that they do
not, as a result, clash with the objectives of the Anglo–Japanese Alliance.’71
On the grounds that the demands were so numerous and so complex, he
refrained from stating his personal opinion until the Foreign Office had a
chance to inspect them carefully.72 According to Langley, Grey had originally
‘expected more of Kato- ’, but now he had lost faith in him: ‘He could not hide
his opinion that the alliance was faltering.’73 Grey was becoming increasingly
mistrustful of Japan, and he had no intention of taking the Japanese expla-
nation at face value. He intended to scrutinize the Japanese to ascertain their
true intentions.
On 1 May China’s foreign minister, Lu Zhengxiang, gave Hioki the Chinese
response to the revised Japanese proposal. The document was adamant in its
rejection of almost all of Group V, arguing that ‘all of those items violate the
sovereignty of the Republic of China, the treaty rights of the Western powers,
and the principles of equal opportunity.’ There was still a wide gap between
the Chinese position and the terms contained in Japan’s revised proposal.
When Kato- read the Chinese response on the morning of 2 May, he began
thinking about resolving the situation with a final notification.74
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At a Cabinet meeting held on 3 May Kato- proposed a plan to issue a final
notification insisting that China concede to the revised document of 26 April,
and the Cabinet members agreed to this suggestion. When the Cabinet met
with the senior statesmen at the Prime Minister’s residence on 4 May, however,
all three of them – Yamagata, Matsukata, and O
-
yama – objected to the plan.
Yamagata began the disagreement during the meeting. As soon as he took
his seat in a room full of Cabinet ministers sitting in a row, he began grum-
bling at O
-
kuma and Kato- in a tone that was both provocative and derisive:
‘What a mess! Now that we’re in this situation, it might be tough for you, Mr.
Foreign Minister, but how about if you go to Beijing and sort things out
personally?’ The silence continued, and when Navy Minister Yashiro Rokuro-
said that the foreign minister could not leave the country during a national
emergency, Yamagata shouted, ‘Stop quibbling!’ Finance Minister Wakatsuki
Reijiro-, who was in attendance at the time, said, ‘It felt like a fire was going to
break out.’75 Since the outbreak of First World War, Kato- had rushed into
entering the war against Germany and issuing the Twenty-One Demands
without sufficiently discussing those decisions with the senior statesmen, and
Yamagata was disgusted with him. Yamagata’s reprimand at the meeting was
an eruption of the dissatisfaction he had been feeling towards Kato- since the
previous year.
Kato- had no intention of visiting Beijing as an ambassador, but he asked
Yamagata what he thought the government’s next step should be. Yamagata
responded, ‘If we can make concessions that do not cause problems, we
should compromise. Surely we cannot compromise on the Manchuria ques-
tion, but there must be items in Group V that we could compromise over
without making trouble.’ Matsukata agreed with Yamagata’s view. Next,
Yamagata said, ‘I merely stated my opinion for your reference’, and, after
asking for ‘the Cabinet to resolve the matter for itself ’, he left the room.
Without reaching a consensus, that morning’s meeting was adjourned.
In a subsequent account by the industrialist Takahashi Yoshio, Yamagata
was recorded as being resigned to the idea of committing troops to ‘matters
of life and death for the nation’, such as Manchuria, but he viewed all of the
items in Group V as nothing more than ‘trivialities’. Convinced that mobi-
lizing troops over such insignificant issues would cause Japan to lose face on
the world stage, Yamagata put all of his energy into stopping ‘such shameful
negotiating tactics’.76 Yamagata had distanced himself from the O
-
kuma
Cabinet, but now that Japan had finally come to the brink of war with China, he
began doing everything in his power to influence the government. Inoue
had been keeping the Cabinet under his tutelage, but since illness prevented
him from attending the meeting he contacted the O
-
kuma Cabinet by tele-
phone from his villa in Okitsu. He criticized the government for submitting
‘unnecessary conditions’ and asked the Cabinet to return Qingdao and seek
accord with the Western powers.77
After the 4 May meeting between the senior statesmen and the Cabinet
ministers ended, the ministers remained in the room and continued their
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deliberations; in the middle of the night, an important telegram arrived from
Grey. It was more sternly written than any of the previous British messages,
effectively demanding that Japan remove Group V.78 What follows is a
quotation from the main section of the telegram:
I earnestly hope there will not be rupture between Japan and China, if, as
I believe, the only outstanding question now is Part v of the Japanese
demands. … I hope, therefore, that Japan will either not press these
points or make it clear that her demands do not bear the construction
that is being placed upon them in some quarters.
At that point, the Cabinet ministers’ agenda focussed on whether or not to
remove Group V from the final notification. Their discussion continued until
the dawn, but ultimately, after a proposal from Home Minister O
-
ura, they deci-
ded to remove Group V. After the draft of the final notification was formally
approved by the Cabinet on 5 May, O
-
ura visited the three senior statesmen –
Yamagata, Matsukata, and O
-
yama – to gain their informal consent.79 On 6
May another meeting between the Cabinet ministers and the senior statesmen
was held at the prime minister’s residence, and the text of the final notification
was formally approved. Based on that decision, a meeting was held with the
Taisho emperor in attendance, during which it was determined that the
final notification would be submitted to the Chinese. Hioki handed the final
notification to the Chinese foreign minister on 7 May.
During that time, Grey reached out to the Japanese once again, asking
them on 6 May to bear in mind the spirit of the Anglo–Japanese alliance and
resolve their negotiations with the Chinese amicably. On the other hand,
Jordan, joined by the ministers from Russia and France, visited Lu Zheng-
xiang on 5 May, and together they pressed him to accept the demands. The
Chinese government maintained its bold stance in the face of Japan’s final
notification, but once it had been delivered and it was clear that the American
intervention the Chinese were counting on was not forthcoming, they des-
pairingly agreed to the demands. Foreign Minister Lu notified Hioki of the
decision to consent to the final notification on 9 May. The Chinese and
Japanese governments worked together to consolidate and revise the phrasing
of the document, and on 25 May the treaty and attached official notices were
signed. Thus, the Sino–Japanese negotiations that had continued for roughly
four months ended in a compromise.
Evaluation of the Twenty-One Demands
On 10 May the Manchester Guardian argued that China had yielded to the
Japanese ultimatum and had saved itself from the violent action which was
being threatened by Japan. Both were ‘congratulated’ in an editorial titled
as ‘China’s decision’. The newspaper highly rated the deletion of Group V as
follows:
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We gladly acknowledge that Japan, in presenting her ultimatum, has
substantially modified her demands. She has, in particular, postponed
‘until a suitable opportunity in the future’ those demands in clause 5
which were an undoubted attack on China’s independence …80
Nevertheless, it also expressed its anxiety as it thought that the demands
which Japan had not withdrawn and China had accepted were serious
enough. It was obvious that the newspaper was still wary of Japan, although
it expressed a welcome for the compromise reached by the two countries.
　Taking a contrary approach, The Times highly praised the way in which
the Japanese government had conducted itself in the final stage of the negotiations.
In an editorial titled ‘The Far Eastern Compromise’ on 10 May, the newspaper
argued that ‘China and Japan have adjusted their differences, and the war cloud
in the Far East has been dispersed’, and ‘all the questions in Group V, of these
proposals, except the Fukien [Fukian] question, on which a compromise had
been already reached, disappeared.’ The following sentences in the editorial
indicate thatThe Times still had confidence in Japan, Britain’s ally, to some extent:
While the courage and the good sense of the Japanese statesmen in
making these extensive modifications in their first proposals are deserving
of the highest praise, the reflection is inevitable that more caution in for-
mulating their original demands and greater tact in the conduct of the
negotiations might have ensured them the advantages they have acquired
without resort to so drastic a step as the issue of the ultimatum. … The
masses in Japan may be disappointed at the compromise to which the
EMPEROR and his advisers have come, but friendly observers abroad
will see in it a fresh proof that her statesmen fix their gaze upon the far-
off future, and have the sagacity and the courage, even in moments of
popular excitements, not to prejudice it by grasping in the present for
more than the present can safely yield.
However, contrary to the editorial, some journalists on The Times already felt a
deep-rooted distrust towards Japan. After the negotiations were concluded, Fraser
summarized the whole process as follows.81 Being the only Western journalist who
had interviewed both Kato- and Hioki, his views are worthy of attention:
The conclusion at which I have arrived, after watching things in Tokyo
for six months, is that Japanese Government have no policy in regard to
China. Nor does there seem to me to be any individual statesman in
Japan possessed of convictions as to the line Japan ought to follow in
China – That is to say, any revealed statesman, with convictions founded
on knowledge & understanding of the situation. Every politician in Japan
thinks Japan ought to do certain things in China, but the opinions of
most of them are based on blissful ignorance of outside considerations,
such as the feelings of the Chinese and the interests of other Powers.
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Conclusion
This paper has examined the various impacts of Japan’s Twenty-One
Demands on Anglo–Japanese relations, mainly focussing on diplomatic
negotiations and newspaper reports. The Japanese government required the
Yuan Shikai administration not to leak the contents of the demands to the
outside world and failed to inform the Great Powers, including its ally, Brit-
ain, of Group V which might conflict with Chinese sovereignty. Group V
included demands to expand Japanese influence over the Chinese government,
thus outmanoeuvring Britain. It breached the trust between the two countries.
Foreign Minister Kato- Takaaki was conscious of this, but was compelled to
attempt such an unreasonable tactic because of the pressure from the hard-
liners in Japan.
Yuan Shikai leaked information on the negotiations in order to arouse an
anti-Japanese movement in China and create distrust towards Japan among
the Great Powers. Yuan did this to break the ties between Japan and the
Great Powers. The leak was remarkably effective, and China succeeded in
inviting international criticism of Japan at the beginning of the talks.
From the present point of view, China’s leaking of this information was
reasonable, and so Kato-, who did not predict this move, appears to have been
inept. However, it can be said that he was only following precedent. In the
Sino–Japanese negotiations immediately after the Russo-Japanese War, the
Chinese government had agreed not to leak information to the outside and no
other countries had intervened. The Chinese broke the practice of the last ten
years and resisted fiercely as the Twenty-One Demands were much greater
than the ones required before then. The media, which was increasingly
developing after the Revolution in 1911, supported the government and sti-
mulated Chinese nationalism. One of the reasons why the negotiations over
the demands came to a deadlock was that the Japanese government did not
recognize both the excessiveness of its policy and the changes in Chinese
politics and society.
This paper has also analyzed in detail the final stage of the negotiations
after the leak of the Chinese government. The British government trusted the
Japanese and did not believe in the rumours about the demands when the
negotiations started, but its attitude became more severe after it became clear
that it had been kept in the dark. After this, it attempted to restrain the
Japanese government by repeatedly insisting that the objectives of the Anglo–
Japanese alliance should be kept in mind. Among the British newspapers, the
Manchester Guardian stood at the forefront of attacks on Japan. On the other
hand, The Times refrained from criticism, but the journalists who had treated
Japan with favour to some degree, such as Henry Wickham Steed and David
Fraser, lost their confidence.
The negotiations between China and Japan came to a deadlock at the end
of April, and some of the Japanese newspapers began to insist on war in case
of their complete breakdown. But the elder statesmen, particularly Yamagata
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Aritomo, urged Kato- to moderate the demands and the British government
reiterated its interpretation of the terms of the alliance. Kato- therefore made
the decision to delete Group V and attempted to make a compromise with
Yuan by sending an ultimatum requiring China to accept the fixed demands.
Some Chinese politicians insisted on continued resistance, but Yuan, with no
prospect of American intervention and with the Entente Powers, including
Britain, recommending the avoidance of war, eventually yielded. As a result
the Chinese government accepted the principal demands of Groups I–IV.
The Japanese government thus succeeded in securing the interests which it
had thought the most important by concluding an agreement with the Chi-
nese government. Therefore it can be seen that the negotiations ended in a
Japanese victory. That is why Yuan Shikai has been unfortunately regarded as
a traitor to his country.82 Nevertheless, Japan lost Chinese confidence during
this crisis and many Chinese began to regard Japan as an ‘enemy’ standing
in the way of the construction of a new country. It is doubtful therefore
whether the methods the Japanese government used to secure its interests
were reasonable. In addition, British politicians and diplomats began to dis-
trust Japan through their experience of this episode.83 While the value of the
Anglo–Japanese alliance was not fundamentally questioned as the Great War
continued, the Twenty-One Demands severely damaged British confidence in
Japan and contributed to the termination of the alliance in 1922.
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